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SURVEY SECTION
Insurance. Geremia v. Allstate Insurance Co., 798 A.2d 939 (R.I.
2002). The interest computation formula set forth in Merrill v.
Trenn, 706 A.2d 1305 (R.I. 1998) must apply to all future and
pending underinsured/uninsured motorist cases as well as to joint
tortfeasors.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On April 23, 1994, the plaintiff, Lisa Geremia, who was in-
sured by Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), sustained injuries
when an underinsured driver rear-ended her car.1 The plaintiff re-
covered $25,000 from the underinsured motorist's insurance com-
pany, and pursued a claim against her insurance company for the
damages she incurred over that amount.2 Notably, plaintiffs in-
surance policy mandated arbitration. 3 On May 30, 2000, after as-
sessing the damages to be $31,800, the arbitration panel made an
award of $6,800 after subtracting the $25,000 paid by the underin-
sured driver's insurance company.4 The arbitrators then added 12
percent interest per annum, creating a total award of $11,764. 5 In
response to the plaintiffs petition to modify the award and to alter
the calculation of interest, Allstate filed its own petition to confirm
the arbitration award.6 The hearing justice denied the plaintiffs
petition and confirmed the award, whereby the plaintiff appealed.7
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
A "mistake of law" is not grounds for overturning an arbitra-
tion award, but an arbitrator's "manifest disregard of the law" is.8
Here, the plaintiffs contention was that the arbitration award was
miscalculated because it did not apply the computation formula
utilizing the pre-judgment interest, set forth in Merrill v. Trenn.9
1. Geremia v. Allstate Ins. Co., 798 A.2d 939, 939-40 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 940.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 941 (citing Merrill v. Trenn, 706 A.2d 1305, 1313-14 (R.I. 1998)
(holding despite earlier settlement of one joint tortfeasor, the remaining tortfeasor
would be charged the statutory interest on the full amount due to the plaintiff from
the time of the accrual of the cause of action to the time of the earlier settlement)).
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However, since that case applied to joint tortfeasors, the arbitra-
tors believed that it did not apply to non-tortfeasors. 10 Although
the court made explicit the requirement that the Trenn formula
also be applied in all pending and future underinsured/uninsured
motorist contexts, the court found that the arbitrators' prior belief
that Trenn did not apply "did not rise to the level of a manifest
error of law," and found that the arbitrators had discretion to
award interest in the way in which they did." Guided by section
10-3-12 of the Rhode Island General Laws, 12 the court found insuf-
ficient "evidence of any material miscalculation of figures or impro-
priety," and that "the award [was] sufficiently clear as to provide a
final and definite award."13 Furthermore, absent any finding that
the trial judge's ruling was clearly wrong, the court upheld that
decision and confirmed the arbitration award.' 4
CONCLUSION
Absent a finding that an arbitration award amounts to a mani-
fest disregard of the law, a court will not overturn such an award
unless their jurisdiction to do so is otherwise prescribed by section
10-3-12. The interest calculation formula set forth in Merrill v.
Trenn now applies to the underinsured/uninsured motorist
context.
Eric W. Nicastro
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-3-12 (1997) provides in pertinent part:
In any of the following cases, the court must make an order vacating the
award upon the application of any party to the arbitration: ... 4) Where
the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submit-
ted was not made.
Id.
13. Geremia, 798 A.2d at 941.
14. Id.
SURVEY SECTION
Insurance. LaBonte v. National Grange Mutual Insurance Co.,
810 A.2d 250 (R.I. 2002). An insurance company does not act in
bad faith by bringing a declaratory judgment action in order to
clarify coverage terms. Also, the possibility of a future conflict be-
tween insurer and insured does not relieve the insured from a duty
to cooperate with the insurance company's investigation of a poten-
tial claim.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
LaBonte, a painting contractor, sanded and painted a portion
of the exterior of a condominium in the summer of 1998.1 The fol-
lowing September, he read an article in a newspaper in which one
of the residents of the condominium alleged that her son had devel-
oped lead poisoning as a result of the sanding LaBonte had per-
formed at the job site.2 LaBonte sent a letter to his insurance
company (defendant) asking them to cover any claims that may
arise from the allegations. 3 In its response to LaBonte's letter, de-
fendant reserved its right to deny coverage.4 In October 1998, the
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management in-
formed defendant of a complaint filed by the resident of the condo-
minium alleging LaBonte's sanding was the cause of her son's lead
poisoning.5 In January 1999, defendant sent a letter requesting
LaBonte submit to an "examination under oath."6 LaBonte then
requested that defendant provide him with independent counsel
for the examination, but the defendant refused.7 LaBonte, in turn,
declined to submit to the examination.8
Defendant then filed suit against LaBonte in federal court.9
Defendant's suit sought a declaratory judgment that LaBonte's
policy excluded coverage of tort claims filed against him as a result
of lead paint contamination.' 0 The declaratory judgment also
sought a determination that LaBonte's failure to participate in the
1. LaBonte v. Nat'l Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 810 A.2d 250, 252 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 252-53.
6. Id. at 253.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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requested examination was a breach of contract." LaBonte then
commenced this action in state court claiming that defendant acted
in bad faith, in violation of section 9-1-33 of the Rhode Island Gen-
eral Laws, when it brought the declaratory judgment action in fed-
eral court. 12 LaBonte also argued that defendant's actions
constituted an abuse of process because the goal of their federal
suit was to acquire information that defendant had hoped to gain
from the requested interview. 13 The trial justice then heard, and
denied, two additional motions brought by LaBonte and, subse-
quently, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on
four counts, including the two discussed here.14 LaBonte then
filed this appeal with the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court held that defendant, by seeking a declara-
tory judgment, was only seeking to clarify the coverage owed to
LaBonte.16 In order to bring a bad faith claim against an insurer,
there must be evidence the insurer refused in bad faith to settle a
claim or otherwise refused to perform its obligations under the in-
surance contract. 17 However, at the time LaBonte brought this ac-
tion, there had been no claim filed against him.' 8 The court also
held that an insurer may bring a declaratory judgment action to
clarify coverage terms without that action being viewed as bad
faith. 19 LaBonte provided no evidence the defendant was doing
anything other than clarifying coverage. 20
LaBonte also argued defendant's actions constituted abuse of
process because they had admitted one of their goals of bringing
the federal suit was to obtain the information they had originally
sought to obtain in the interview with LaBonte regarding the origi-
11. Id.
12. Id. at 252-53. The statute allows a claim when the insurance company
wrongfully, or in bad faith, refused to pay, settle a claim, or perform its obligations
under the contract. Id. at 254 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-2-33 (1997)).
13. Id. at 252, 254.
14. Id. at 253.
15. Id. at 252-53.
16. Id. at 253-54.
17. Id. at 254.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20, Id.
SURVEY SECTION
nal lead paint issue.2'1 However, defendant claimed in the federal
suit that LaBonte had breached his insurance contract by refusing
to participate in the interview.22 The supreme court agreed with
defendant and held that defendant's actions were not ulterior or
wrongful, but were instead, straightforward, and legitimate. 23 The
court held that an insured has a duty to cooperate with his or her
insurance carrier and this duty is not diminished by the possibility
of future conflict with the carrier.24 Accordingly, the supreme
court denied LaBonte's appeal and affirmed the judgment of the
lower court.25
CONCLUSION
An insurance company does not act in bad faith by bringing a
declaratory judgment action in order to clarify coverage terms. An
insurer wishing to avoid liability may bring a declaratory judg-
ment action in order to clarify coverage. Also, the possibility of a
future conflict between insurer and insured does not relieve the
insured from a duty to cooperate with the insurance company's in-
vestigation of a potential claim.
Joe H. Lawson II
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 255.
25. Id.
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Insurance: Skaling v. Aetna Insurance Co., 799 A.2d 997 (R.I.
2002). In a first-party claim of bad faith refusal of coverage, the
insured need not obtain a judgment as a matter of law on the un-
derlying breach-of-contract claim. This holding overrules Bartlett
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 538 A.2d 997 (R.I.
1988).
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On October 20, 1995, plaintiff Robert Skaling was perma-
nently injured when he fell from a railroad trestle bridge while at-
tempting to rescue Matty Webber, a passenger in a Jeep driven by
the underinsured tortfeasor, Shaun Menard. 1 Skaling endured
two months of hospitalization and incurred medical expenses in ex-
cess of $50,000.2 He subsequently received $25,000 (the limit of
Menard's policy) in a settlement with Menard's insurance carrier.3
Plaintiff sought to receive underinsured insurance benefits from
his own insurance carrier, Aetna Insurance Company (Aetna).4
Aetna denied the claim based on a finding that the injury did not
arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the vehicle. 5 In
the complaint in superior court, plaintiff alleged breach-of-contract
for failure to pay underinsured motorist benefits, and insurer bad
faith. 6 The claim of insurer bad faith was severed, and summary
judgment was granted upon Aetna's motion.7 Defendant urged
that Skaling's failure to obtain a directed verdict on the breach-of-
contract claim precluded him from recovering on the insurer bad
faith claim according to Bartlett." On appeal here, Skaling main-
tained that reversal of the grant of summary judgment is man-
dated by section 9-1-33 of the Rhode Island General Laws,9 and
that the standard of proof in Bartlett is inappropriate and
insurmountable.10
1. Skaling v. Aetna Ins. Co., 799 A.2d 997, 1001 (R.I. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1000.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1001.
9. Section 9-1-33 provides, in pertinent part, "the question of whether or not
an insurer has acted in bad faith in refusing to settle a claim shall be a question to
be determined by the trier of fact." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-33 (1997).
10. Skaling, 799 A.2d at 1002.
SURVEY SECTION
BACKGROUND
In Bartlett, the Rhode Island Supreme Court placed a heavy
burden on the plaintiff attempting to establish a claim of bad faith
refusal to settle by requiring the litigant to establish entitlement
to a directed verdict on the contract claim." In other words, the
plaintiff must demonstrate breach-of-contract as a matter of law. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court had to decide "whether, in
the context of first-party claims, an insurer is insulated from a
claim of bad faith simply because plaintiff was unable to obtain a
judgment as a matter of law in the underlying breach-of-contract
action." 13 The court held it did not.14 The court illustrated many
situations where the determination of the underlying contract
claim could not be determined as a matter of law.' 5 It found par-
ticularly compelling the instance where the validity of a contract
claim rests on a disputed fact such as an oral conversation between
the insured and insurer. 16 Those "factual disputes cannot be de-
termined as a matter of law."1 7 If a jury accepts plaintiffs version
of events, the defendant should not be insulated from a bad faith
claim.' 8 The court further points out that if this standard of proof
were to apply, then a defendant in this situation would be insu-
lated from a bad faith claim notwithstanding a showing of reckless
conduct and oppressive tactics. 19 After a thorough examination of
other jurisdictions, 20 the court held that "the directed verdict stan-
dard of proof in this context is unworkable and unjust."21 It de-
clined, however, to "abandon the rule that an insurer has the right
to debate a claim that is fairly debatable."22
11. Id. at 1003 (citing Bartlett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d
997, 1001 (R.I. 1988)).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1006-10.
21. Id. at 1003.
22. Id. at 1010.
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Additionally, the directed verdict standard did not comport
with section 9-1-33 of the Rhode Island General Laws.23 Consis-
tent with section 9-1-33, the court announced that bad faith is es-
tablished when the "proof demonstrates that the insurer denied
coverage or refused payment without a reasonable basis in fact or
law."2 4 It further noted the significance of this new rule in this
jurisdiction where claims of insurer bad faith are severed from the
underlying breach-of-contract claim. 25
Finally, the court's decision comports with Rhode Island public
policy, which imposes implied-in-law obligations of good faith and
fair dealing on an insurer doing business in the state.26
It makes little sense that an insurance company may... be-
have in a manner inconsistent with its implied duties of fair
dealing and be insulated from tort liability for its bad faith
conduct because it fortuitously survives a motion for judg-
ment as a matter of law, yet is ultimately found to have
breached the insurance contract.27
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court overruled Bartlett, and an-
nounced the new standard that a plaintiff claiming bad faith need
not establish breach-of-contract as a matter of law. Proof that the
insurer denied coverage without a reasonable basis can be estab-
lished in either law or fact.
Eric W. Nicastro
23. Id. at 1003 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-33 (1997)).
24. Id. at 1010.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1005.
27. Id.
